Carlos Chávez Rebolledo

  Martes, 4 de Abril de 2017

  15:00 - 16:00

   Santiago CESS, Concha y Toro 32C, Santiago

   Deterring Poaching from a Common Pool: Experimental Evidence from TURFs in Chile

ABSTRACT

(con Jim Murphy y John K. Stranlund)
This work presents the results of an economic field experiment designed to study behavioral issues related to both the protection of a common-pool resource from poaching by outsiders, and the problem of managing a local common resource within a group under the presence of outsiders when enforcement is imperfect and costly. We have two specific objectives. First, to study the ability of group members to manage the resource in the presence of poaching. We examine the consequences of the inclusion of additional subjects, called “outsiders,” who do not have the right to harvest the resource or participate in management decisions, but can decide to encroach on the TURF and poach the resource. Second, to study different methods for the “insiders” to monitor the resource and impose sanctions. In all cases, monitoring is imperfect (i.e., there is a chance that poaching will not be detected). Enforcement treatments in our experiment include: i) relying on an external agency to provide enforcement; and ii) allowing insiders to share the responsibility of monitoring the resource at a personal cost. The experiments were conducted in the field with 210 members of local artisanal fishing organizations in central-southern Chile. The participants are members of organizations exploiting benthic resources under TURFs regulation.